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THE FIRST CIRCUIT STRIKES OUT IN JONES v. CITY OF BOSTON :
A PITCH FOR PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
IN DISPARATE IMPACT CASES
MICHAEL STENGER*
“Do not put your faith in what statistics say until you have
carefully considered what they do not say.”1
I. INTRODUCTION: COURTS ARE “STRIKING OUT”
IN DETERMINING SIGNIFICANCE
Despite their best efforts to comply with the law, modern employers
are likely to face allegations of unlawful discrimination.2  While most em-
ployers are aware that purposeful, overt discrimination is illegal, many fail
to realize the extent of liability potentially resulting from practices or poli-
cies that have the effect of discriminating against a protected class.3  Em-
ployers increasingly utilize statistics in hiring practices, collecting and
analyzing data about applicants and employees to determine who makes
the best employee.4  Employing “Moneyball”-type statistical analyses may
be useful to employers in amassing a more productive workforce, but it
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 2012,
Hartwick College.  I would like to thank my parents, Bill and Deb Stenger, my
brother Eric, and all other family, friends, and loved ones who supported me
during the writing of this Note and throughout my entire life.  Also, many thanks
to the editors of the Villanova Law Review for their thoughtful insights and
assistance during the writing of this Note.
1. Quotes About Statistics, MY STATISTICS: MAKING SENSE OF DATA, http://www
.mystatistics.info/page0/page0.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (quoting William
W. Watt).
2. See Arlene Switzer Steinfield & Andrew D. Peters, Dealing with Employees Who
Are Suing Your Company, CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.corpcounsel
.com/id=1202666703184? (noting many companies will face discrimination or har-
assment suits at one time or another); see also U.S. EEOC, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 Charges, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm
(last visited Dec. 31, 2014) (providing statistics on number of employment discrim-
ination charges filed with EEOC).  In 2013, the EEOC received 67,558 complaints
of illegal discrimination under Title VII, of which 12,005 led to some sort of finan-
cial liability to employers. See id.  Plaintiffs received $255.9 million in total dam-
ages, or about $21,316 per successful plaintiff. See id.
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012) (codifying disparate impact theory of
discrimination).
4. See Jamie Konn, Analytics and . . . Employment Law?, LABOR DISH (Sept. 15,
2014), http://www.labordish.com/2014/09/15/analytics-and-employment-law/
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also increases employers’ risk of exposure to disparate impact claims
under 42 U.S.C § 1981.5
Since its inception in 1971, the disparate impact theory of employ-
ment discrimination has been arguably the most controversial and most
inconsistently applied framework under which employers are held liable
for discrimination.6  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits em-
ployers from discriminating on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin . . . .”7  Originally enacted to prevent outright acts of dis-
crimination, Title VII was expanded to forbid employers from enacting
facially neutral employment practices that disproportionately impact a
protected group.8  Much of the inconsistency in the disparate impact con-
5. See id. (“There is a greater risk of a disparate impact claim when analytics
are used in the hiring stage . . . .”). See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE
ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2004) (telling story of Oakland Athletics Gen-
eral Manager Billy Beane and his revolutionary use of statistics in Major League
Baseball).  Employers have turned to statistics as a predictor of performance, much
in the same way that Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics have utilized
“sabermetrics” in evaluating baseball prospects. See id.  “Moneyball” refers to the
assessment of baseball talent from a statistical, quantitative standpoint, rather than
the traditional, subjective measures used by Major League franchises for much of
the sport’s history. See id.
6. See Michael K. Grimaldi, Disparate Impact After Ricci and Lewis, 14
SCHOLAR 165, 166 (2011) (“The disparate-impact theory of employment discrim-
ination has remained controversial since its inception.”); Herman N. Johnson, Jr.,
Disambiguating the Disparate Impact Claim, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 433, 434
(2013) (hinting disparate impact may receive “ominous reception” in future Su-
preme Court cases); Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility and Disparate Impact, 64 HASTINGS
L.J. 287, 295 (2013) (“[D]isparate impact has been marked with controversy since
its inception.”); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 701, 702 (2006) (arguing that disparate impact theory has attracted most
attention and controversy within antidiscrimination law); see also Ricci v. DeStef-
ano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that disparate
impact theory may be unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause).  Justice
Scalia described the difficulty employers have in enacting policies that satisfy both
the disparate treatment and disparate impact provisions of Title VII:
The difficulty is this: Whether or not Title VII’s disparate-treatment provi-
sions forbid “remedial” race-based actions when a disparate-impact viola-
tion would not otherwise result . . . it is clear that Title VII not only
permits but affirmatively requires such actions when a disparate-impact vio-
lation would otherwise result. . . .  Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions
place a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to . . . make
decisions based on (because of) [ ] racial outcomes.
Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer—to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . . be-
cause of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”).
8. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (interpreting Title
VII to include disparate impact cause of action).  The Supreme Court held that
Congress’s intent in enacting Title VII was “the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to dis-
criminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.” Id.  As such,
the Court reasoned that Congress had forbidden “giving [testing or measuring
procedures] controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure
of job performance.” Id. at 436.
2
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text stems from the difficulty courts experience in determining whether
plaintiffs have demonstrated a prima facie case.9  In order to demonstrate
a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff must show
that an employment practice or policy (1) is used by an employer and
(2) causes an adverse impact on a protected class.10
In order to prove the causation element, plaintiffs typically provide
statistical analyses that compare the selection rates of majority and minor-
ity employees to demonstrate that the disparity adversely impacts the
plaintiffs’ class.11  Judges must determine whether to assign weight to such
statistical analyses, but they have done so in an arbitrary and unpredictable
manner.12  Further, courts have wrestled with when to properly label a
given sample as statistically significant, or when to take other factors into
consideration.13
Notably, there exists one “other” factor that some courts have incor-
porated into their disparate impact analyses: demonstration of practical
significance.14  Nevertheless, many courts often choose to ignore the prac-
tical implications of a statistically significant sample, despite evidence that
statistical significance is not, in all circumstances, an accurate measure of
adverse impact.15  Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
practical significance requirement directly, several lower courts have taken
9. For discussion of a prima facie case and courts’ determination of the causa-
tion element, see infra notes 27–88 and accompanying text.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (codifying requirements for plaintiff’s
prima facie case).
11. See D.H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV.
1333, 1335 (1986) (describing how courts evaluating Title VII cases have come to
expect standard deviation analysis); see also Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078, 1082
(4th Cir. 1982) (holding that all cases involving racial discrimination require appli-
cation of standard deviation analysis).  While not all circuits have demanded a
showing of statistical analysis, it is incredibly rare for plaintiffs not to offer some
sort of statistical evidence to support the causation prong of their case. See Watson
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion) (sug-
gesting that plaintiffs should establish causation by offering sufficient statistical
evidence).
12. For a discussion of the inconsistent weight given to statistical evidence in
the lower courts, see infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
13. See Kaye, supra note 11, at 1339–40 (describing evidentiary issue of al-
lowing uncontroverted testimony of statistical experts to determine existence of
prima facie case at trial); Allan G. King, “Gross Statistical Disparities” as Evidence of a
Pattern and Practice of Discrimination: Statistical Versus Legal Significance, 22 LAB. LAW.
271, 272 (2007) (“[L]ower courts frequently have turned to ‘statistical significance’
as the measuring rod.”); see also Tracy Bateman Farrell et al., Four-Fifths or 80%
Rule, 45A AM. JUR. 2D JOB DISCRIMINATION § 313 (describing four-fifths rule as use-
ful benchmark in analyzing Title VII disparate impact testing cases).
14. See, e.g., Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376–77 (2d
Cir. 1991) (citing Bilingual Bicultural Coal. on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC., 595 F.2d
621, 642 n.57 (D.C. Cir. 1978)) (holding that statistical significance is not indica-
tive of “importance, magnitude, or practical significance” of presented disparity (em-
phasis added)).
15. See Kaye, supra note 11, at 1365 (calling into question ability of statistical
significance testing to satisfy legal standards of proof).
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the standard into consideration and are divided as to the necessity of a
practical significance standard.16
Jones v. City of Boston,17 a recent First Circuit case, illustrates the diffi-
culties that courts experience when it comes to determining the signifi-
cance of statistical analyses in the face of practical objections.18  The First
Circuit rejected the need for plaintiffs to demonstrate the practical signifi-
cance of a statistically significant sample, despite strong evidence to sug-
gest that such a showing was necessary in the case.19
This Note argues that the First Circuit was incorrect in rejecting the
practical significance standard and proposes a workable framework for
courts that incorporates both statistical and practical considerations.20
Part II provides an overview of disparate impact and examines the analyti-
cal progression courts undergo in a disparate impact claim.21  Part III
traces the facts of Jones and explains the court’s reasoning in rejecting
practical significance as a measure of disparate impact.22  Part IV presents
arguments against the court’s holding in Jones, while Part V proposes a
uniform two-part test for incorporating significance at the prima facie
stage.23  Part VI concludes by discussing the impact of Jones within the First
Circuit and beyond.24
II. STEPPING UP TO THE PLATE: THE HISTORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT
The disparate impact theory—though one of the most significant de-
velopments in employment discrimination jurisprudence—has evolved
from a controversial history.25  Courts have addressed the theory by em-
16. For a discussion of the circuit split over the practical significance stan-
dard, see infra notes 73–88 and accompanying text.
17. 752 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2014).
18. See, e.g., id.
19. See id. at 53 (holding that demonstration of practical significance is not
required by Title VII to prove prima facie case of disparate impact).
20. For a critical analysis of Jones, see infra notes 127–43 and accompanying
text.
21. For a discussion of the history of disparate impact and practical signifi-
cance, see infra notes 25–88 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the facts of Jones and the court’s reasoning, see infra
notes 89–126 and accompanying text.
23. For a critical analysis of the First Circuit’s holding in Jones, see infra notes
127–43 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the proposed two-part signifi-
cance test, see infra notes 144–76 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of Jones, see infra notes 177–83 and accom-
panying text.
25. See Selmi, supra note 6, at 702–05 (describing disparate impact as contro-
versial from its inception and having made no noticeable societal change).  For a
discussion of the history of disparate impact law in the Supreme Court, see infra
notes 27–38 and accompanying text.
4
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ploying different standards to determine the existence of disparate
impact.26
A. Leveling the Playing Field: Griggs and the History of
the Disparate Impact Doctrine
Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.27  During the seven years after
the enactment of Title VII, courts interpreted this prohibition to include
only intentional discrimination, such as refusing to hire or firing a person
because of their membership in a protected class.28
In 1971, in a landmark case, the Supreme Court expanded the mean-
ing of Title VII to include a more subtle form of discrimination: the use of
facially-neutral practices or policies that adversely impact a protected
class.29  In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,30 a group of black plaintiffs challenged
Duke Power’s policy that all employees must have a high school diploma
and score satisfactorily on a general aptitude test, which served to pre-
clude many black applicants from gaining employment or promo-
tion within the company.31  The Court held that requirements such as
those implemented by Duke Power violated Title VII because they were
not related to successful job performance, and they disqualified black
applicants at a much higher rate than white applicants.32  After Griggs,
26. For a discussion of the different approaches that lower courts have taken
in disparate impact cases, see infra notes 39–88 and accompanying text.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
28. See Gary D. Sanders, Note, Disparate Impact Analysis May Be Applied to Prove
Racial Discrimination in Subjective Employment Decisions: Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 20 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1381, 1383–84 (1989) (describing disparate treatment
theory of discrimination).  The Supreme Court noted that this type of intentional
disparate treatment is “the most easily understood type of discrimination.  The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
29. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
30. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
31. See id. at 427–28 (providing facts of Griggs).  Although the plaintiffs could
not prove that Duke Power adopted the requirements malevolently, they were able
to demonstrate that significant disparities existed between whites and blacks as to
both requirements. See id. at 429 n.6 (describing disparities between races in pas-
sage rates on aptitude tests and in high school graduation rates).  In 1960, only
12% of black males in North Carolina (Duke Power’s place of business) had a high
school diploma, compared to 34% of white males. See id.  Similarly, black test-
takers passed the standard aptitude tests at a much lower rate (6%) than did their
white counterparts (58%). See id.
32. See id. at 429 (noting objective of Title VII to achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunities).  The Court held that “practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”
Id. at 430.  In enacting Title VII, Congress intended to remove “artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of . . . impermissible classification[s].” Id. at 431.
5
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the Court continued to expand and strengthen the disparate impact
theory.33
Nearly two decades after Griggs, the Court, perhaps overzealously, at-
tempted to significantly limit its expanded interpretation in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio.34  In Wards Cove, non-white plaintiffs alleged that
their employer’s hiring practices caused a racial divide between white and
non-white employees.35  In rejecting the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim,
the Court held that employers need only provide a business justification
for apparently discriminatory hiring practices.36  Subsequently, in passing
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress rejected the Court’s reasoning and
statutorily superseded the Court’s Wards Cove holding.37  Since the passage
33. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425–28 (1975) (es-
tablishing burden-shifting framework in disparate impact claims).  In 1975, the
Court fleshed out the prima facie case requirements and burden-shifting proce-
dure in Albemarle Paper. See id.  The Court held that after a plaintiff makes out a
prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that the busi-
ness practice was required by a business necessity. See id. at 425.  If the employer
can demonstrate business necessity or “job relatedness,” the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to prove the existence of a less-discriminatory alternative practice that
the defendant could have adopted. See id. at 426.  In Albemarle Paper, the Court
held that “it remains open to the complaining party to show that other tests or
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy workmanship.’” Id. at
425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
34. 490 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1989) (holding that “business justification” was ap-
propriate defense to alleged discriminatory practice and that burden of proof in
rebutting employer’s justification falls on plaintiffs).  At the time of the decision,
but before the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed, the Wards Cove holding was the
subject of much academic attention and was generally regarded as a misstep by the
Supreme Court in its disparate impact jurisprudence. See, e.g., Michael K. Braswell,
Gary A. Moore & Bill Shaw, Disparate Impact Theory in the Aftermath of Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio: Burdens of Proof, Statistical Evidence, and Affirmative Action, 54
ALB. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1989) (“The 1989 Supreme Court decision in [Wards Cove] is a
major ‘stride backwards’ concerning the use of disparate impact theory . . . .” (foot-
notes omitted)); see also Grimaldi, supra note 6, at 172 (describing disparate impact
theory as having “near-death experience” in Wards Cove).
35. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 646–48 (providing factual background).  The
employer, an Alaskan salmon cannery, had two general types of jobs: unskilled
cannery positions and non-cannery managerial positions. See id. at 647.  Native
Alaskans and Filipinos comprised a vast majority of the cannery positions, while
their white coworkers held virtually all of the managerial positions. See id.  The
plaintiffs alleged that the disparity between white and non-white employees was
caused by the company subjectively declining to offer non-whites the higher-paying
non-cannery jobs. See id. at 647–48.
36. See id. at 658–59 (detailing business justification defense).
37. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (rejecting reasoning of Wards Cove and adopting
reasoning of Griggs and Albemarle).  The amended statute read as follows:
(a) Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) is
amended by adding at the end of the following new subsection:
(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate im-
pact is established under this title only if—
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on
6
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of the 1991 amendments, the Court has expanded the disparate impact
doctrine to include subjective hiring or promotional practices and has as-
signed liability where one of an employer’s many individual hiring prac-
tices has a disparate impact, despite the overall hiring process having no
such impact.38
B. Here Comes the Curveball: Lower Courts’ Application of the Doctrine
Without definitive guidance from the Supreme Court on the issue,
lower courts have struggled to come up with a workable solution for the
most important stage of analysis in disparate impact cases: a plaintiff’s
demonstration that there exists a causal connection between the selected
employment practice and the alleged discriminatory impact.39  Generally,
plaintiffs and defendants turn to three arguments to establish or disprove
causation: statistical significance, the four-fifths rule, and practical
significance.40
1. Statistical Significance
The most common, persuasive, and widely-accepted method that
plaintiffs offer to demonstrate causation is the statistical significance analy-
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is
job related for the position in question and consistent with busi-
ness necessity . . . .
Id.
38. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plural-
ity opinion) (holding that subjective or discretionary employment policies may be
challenged under disparate impact theory); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440 (1982).  In Teal, a Connecticut state agency used a written examination as the
first step in its promotion test, which black candidates passed at 68% the rate of
white candidates. See id. at 443.  Although the agency promoted black employees
at a rate 170% higher than that of white employees, the Court still found that
disparate impact existed in the agency’s testing procedures because the test elimi-
nated an impermissibly high percentage of black applicants. See id. at 456.  The
Court thus rejected the “bottom line” defense to a prima facie showing of dispa-
rate impact discrimination because Title VII guarantees equality in hiring and pro-
motion policies and practices. See id.  Despite the Court’s expansion of the
doctrine in these cases, scholars have suggested that the Court has begun to chip
away at the disparate impact doctrine with its holding in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S.
557 (2009). See, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact, 49
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 125, 128–33 (2014) (describing Supreme Court’s view of
disparate impact as skeptical in recent rulings).
39. See Maxwell O. Chibundu, Delinking Disproportionality from Discrimination:
Procedural Burdens as Proxy for Substantive Visions, 23 N.M. L. REV. 87, 132 (1993)
(describing how lower courts have struggled to distinguish disparate impact and
disparate treatment theories of discrimination and thus have confused causation
prong of both tests).
40. See Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimi-
nation, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 782–88 (2009) (describing statistical significance and four-
fifths tests); see also Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.
1991) (embracing defendant’s argument that practical significance is appropriate
measure of disparate impact).
7
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sis, also known as a standard deviation analysis.41  Although statistical anal-
yses may vary in technical form, they all measure the probability that an
observed disparity is the product of chance; in other words, a standard
deviation analysis calculates how much a given sample differs from a dif-
ferent hypothetical sample which assumes equal opportunity.42  A differ-
ence of roughly two standard deviations equates to a 5% chance that the
measured disparity was a result of chance.43
The Supreme Court first turned to statistics as a measure of causation
in the employment discrimination context in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States.44  In Teamsters, the plaintiffs alleged that their
employer had discriminated against African-American and Hispanic em-
ployees and offered a statistical analysis of the disparity in hiring and pro-
motion rates between minority and white employees.45  The Court gave
the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence substantial weight, noting that statistics
can be especially probative in revealing imbalances in the racial composi-
tion of a work force.46  The Court confirmed that statistical analyses were
41. See MICHAEL D. LIEDER, HOT ISSUES CONCERNING USE OF STATISTICAL EVI-
DENCE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTION LITIGATION, SPRENGER LANG
PLLC (2009), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-annualcle/09/
materials/data/papers/103.pdf (detailing courts’ evaluation of causation in terms
of standard deviations).
42. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 785–87 (describing function of various signif-
icance tests); see also MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION 133 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 8th ed. 2012) (explaining
probability testing generally).  “[P]robability theory starts with a comparison be-
tween the ‘observed’ racial (or gender or age) distribution in the employer’s work
force and the ‘expected,’ that is, the racial distribution one would anticipate if race
were not a factor in the selection of employees.” Id.
43. See King, supra note 13, at 292 (citing Griffin v. Bd. of Regents of Regency
Univ., 795 F.2d 1281, 1291 n.19 (7th Cir. 1986)) (explaining that 1.96 standard
deviations corresponds to .05 level of statistical significance).
44. 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (holding that statistical analysis was probative in
demonstrating discrimination).
45. See id. at 337–39 (describing plaintiffs’ proffered statistical analysis).  The
plaintiffs presented evidence that African-Americans and Hispanics made up 5%
and 4% of the company’s 6,472 employees respectively, and that among the
sought-after position of “line driver,” only 0.4% were African-American and 0.3%
were Hispanic. See id. at 337–38.
46. See id. at 339 n.20 (describing utility of statistical analyses).  The Court
noted that statistics can often uncover covert or even unintentional discriminatory
employment practices:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such
as this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of pur-
poseful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected
that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the
population in the community from which employees are hired. . . .
“Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the courts have fre-
quently relied upon statistical evidence to prove a violation. . . .  In many
cases the only available avenue of proof is the use of racial statistics to
uncover clandestine and covert discrimination by the employer or union
involved.”
8
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the approved means of establishing causation in employment discrimina-
tion cases in Hazelwood School District v. United States.47  Relying on a jury
selection discrimination case it had decided earlier that year, the Court
held that statistical analyses revealing a disparity of “two or three standard
deviations” reflected a “gross” statistical difference, such that illegal dis-
crimination could be inferred.48
The issue of statistical analyses being offered to prove causation arose
again in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust.49  In a plurality opinion, the
Court noted that lower courts had not been instructed to apply the Hazel-
wood “two-to-three standard deviations” analysis in a mechanistic fashion.50
Instead, the Court advised that lower courts should analyze statistical evi-
dence on a case-by-case basis in light of the surrounding facts and circum-
stances.51  The Court has also noted recently that statistical significance
may be enough to demonstrate a prima facie case.52
Although not explicitly instructed to do so, lower courts have adopted
the Hazelwood threshold in weighing the significance of a standard devia-
tion analysis.53  Several circuits have even gone so far as to hold that any
sample not rising to a disparity of at least two standard deviations is inad-
missible as proof of causation.54  Other courts prefer statistical signifi-
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,
443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1971)).
47. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
48. Id. at 308 n.14; see also id. at 307 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339) (hold-
ing that “gross” statistical disparities alone may constitute prima facie case in cer-
tain circumstances).  In Hazelwood, the plaintiff teachers brought suit against their
school district alleging discrimination in the district’s employment patterns and
practices. See id. at 301.  The Court held that the proper groups to compare were
not the percentage of black teachers in the school district and the percentage of
black students in the district, as the district court had held, but rather the proper
comparison was the racial composition of the district’s work force and the racial
composition of the “qualified public school teacher population in the relevant la-
bor market.” Id. at 308.
49. 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion).
50. See id. at 995 n.3 (noting that Court had not suggested that set number of
standard deviations can determine prima facie case).  The Court noted that it had
“emphasized the useful role that statistical methods can have in Title VII cases, but
[had] not suggested that any particular number of ‘standard deviations’ can deter-
mine whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in the complex area of
employment discrimination.” Id. (citing Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 311 n.17).
51. See id. (holding that case-by-case approach is appropriate manner of ana-
lyzing standard deviations).
52. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (“[A] prima facie case of
disparate-impact liability [is] essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statis-
tical disparity . . . .” (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982))).
53. See King, supra note 13, at 276 (“[M]any lower courts have adopted the
Castaneda-Hazelwood criterion of ‘two or three standard deviations’ as a bright-line
rule.”).
54. See, e.g., Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep’t of Fire & Safety Servs., 224 F.3d
735, 741 (8th Cir. 2000) (rejecting small sample size due to lack of statistical signif-
icance); Bennett v. Total Minatome Corp., 138 F.3d 1053, 1062 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that plaintiff failed to raise inference of discrimination after failing to
9
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cance tests as evidence of disparate impact because they quantify the
certainty with which it can be inferred that the impact is not a product of
chance.55
Despite its mathematical nature, a standard deviation analysis is not
without its weaknesses.56  The most notable weakness is its sensitivity to
sample size: the larger the sample size, the more magnified differences
appear in relation to standard deviation.57  Put simply, larger sample sizes
are more conducive to a finding of statistical significance, even when ac-
tual differences are in fact small.58  In order to achieve a larger sample
size—and hence a finding of statistical significance—plaintiffs typically ag-
gregate data from numerous years in order to make their proffered sam-
ple statistically significant.59  Courts are generally willing to accept
aggregation as a tool to achieve a sample size large enough to produce
statistically significant results.60  However, some courts have also ques-
demonstrate statistical significance); Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 95 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (rejecting plaintiff’s statistical analysis for lack of significance).
55. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[A statistically significant] difference strongly indicates some influence on the re-
sults other than the operation of pure chance.”); Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d
1078, 1082 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that disparate impact cases require standard
deviation analysis).
56. For a discussion of the weaknesses of standard deviation analyses, see infra
notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
57. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 787 (“Statistical significance is also tremen-
dously sensitive to sample size. . . .  [T]he larger the number of applicants, the
smaller the magnitude of difference that will be statistically significant . . . .”);
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1067
(1985) (noting that large samples increase likelihood of finding statistical signifi-
cance); Tom Tinkham, The Uses and Misuses of Statistical Proof in Age Discrimination
Claims, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357, 376 (2010) (noting that large sample
sizes can disguise lack of practical significance).
58. See Rubinfeld, supra note 57, at 1067 (“[T]-statistics are quite sensitive to
the size of the sample being studied.  With a sufficiently large sample, the likeli-
hood of getting a t-value greater than two can get large.”).
59. See Richard E. Biddle, Disparate Impact Analysis with Small Samples, CAL. LAB.
& EMP. L. Q. (Fall 1995), available at http://www.biddle.com/documents/dis-
paratesmall.htm (providing various aggregation methods plaintiffs use to increase
sample size).  The EEOC Guidelines accept several scenarios in which aggregation
may be appropriate, including: aggregating data from the same test given for sev-
eral jobs within the same company; aggregating data from similar tests given for
the same job over many years; aggregating several years of data for one job; and
aggregating data for more than one minority group. Id.
60. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 313 (1977)
(permitting aggregation because data for applicants from separate occupation cen-
sus codes were similar enough for analytical purposes); Paige v. California, 291
F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is a generally accepted principle that aggre-
gated statistical data may be used where it is more probative than subdivided
data.”); Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Cntys., 833 F.2d 1334, 1340 n.8 (9th Cir.
1987) (allowing analysis of aggregated nine-year sample because it was most proba-
tive in light of surrounding circumstances); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1981).  The
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures also support aggregation
in certain circumstances: “Where [ ] evidence concerning the impact of a selection
procedure indicates adverse impact but is based upon numbers which are too
10
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tioned the viability of aggregation by scrutinizing its probative value in
light of other considerations.61
2. The Four-Fifths Rule
As an alternative to a showing of statistical significance, plaintiffs and
defendants alike frequently turn to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (EEOC) “four-fifths” rule to prove or disprove the existence
of disparate impact.62  The rule dictates that a selection rate (for promo-
tions, hires, or related employment decisions) of a protected class that is
less than four-fifths (or eighty percent) of the selection rate for the group
with the highest selection rate will be considered actionable by the
EEOC.63  Though the Supreme Court has labeled the four-fifths rule as
nothing more than a rule of thumb for the courts, it has also noted that
small to be reliable, evidence concerning the impact of the procedure over a
longer period of time . . . may be considered in determining adverse impact.”  Id.
61. See, e.g., Apsley v. Boeing Co., 722 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1238 (D. Kan. 2010)
(rejecting plaintiffs’ aggregation of data to make prima facie case of age discrimi-
nation); United States v. City of Yonkers, 609 F. Supp. 1281, 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(“A need to aggregate [data] to achieve statistical significance may lessen the pro-
bative force of the data . . . .”).  In cases of employers with a large workforce, a
standard deviation analysis based on aggregation of data from different depart-
ments within the company or from a number of years may not always be appropri-
ate. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 787 (“[T]he statistical significance rule could be
said to have a disparate impact on large employers because even a small disparity
may achieve statistical significance.”).
62. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).  The relevant portion of the Code of Federal
Regulations notes:
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-
fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest
rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as
evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will gen-
erally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of
adverse impact.  Smaller differences in selection rate may nevertheless
constitute adverse impact, where they are significant in both statistical
and practical terms or where a user’s actions have discouraged applicants
disproportionately on grounds of race, sex, or ethnic group.
Id.
63. See id.  For example, a promotion test that 50 out of 100 men (50%) pass,
but that 80 out of 100 women (80%) pass, would be considered evidence of dis-
crimination because 50% is less than four-fifths of 80% (50% < 64%). See Adop-
tion of Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common Interpretation of
the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 11996,
11998 (Mar. 2, 1979) (providing formula for calculating four-fifths rule).  To de-
termine whether the four-fifths rule has been satisfied, one must use the following
four-step process:
(1) [C]alculate the rate of selection for each group (divide the number
of persons selected from a group by the number of applicants from that
group);
(2) observe which group has the highest selection rate;
(3) calculate the impact ratios by comparing the selection rate for each
group with that of their highest group (divide the selection rate for a
group by the selection rate for the highest group);
11
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EEOC guidelines deserve a measure of respect.64  With no clear guidance
from the Supreme Court as to the weight that should be given to the rule,
or when to properly apply it, circuits are split over parties using it to
demonstrate or disprove impact.65  Federal district courts have also been
divided over the rule’s use.66  Despite the courts’ skepticism of the four-
fifths rule, several federal agencies have adopted the rule as a standard for
determining when to act on a claim.67
(4) observe whether the selection rate for any group is substantially less
(i.e., usually less than 4/5ths or 80%) than the selection rate for the high-
est group.  If it is, adverse impact is indicated in most circumstances.
Id.
64. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988) (plu-
rality opinion) (noting four-fifths rule “has not provided more than a rule of
thumb for the courts”); see also Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399
(2008) (describing EEOC Guidelines as reflecting “a body of experience and in-
formed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for gui-
dance. . . .  As such they are entitled to a measure of respect. . . .” (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Despite its history of distrust in the
rule, recently the Court essentially changed the meaning of the above quote from
Watson; in Ricci v. DeStefano the Court quoted only the last part of the Watson
description, noting that the four-fifths rule “is ‘a rule of thumb for the courts.’”
557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 n.3).
65. See, e.g., Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. App’x 133, 139 (3d Cir.
2010) (describing four-fifths rule as “non-binding” and refusing to use it as factor
to determine existence of disparate impact); Allen v. City of Chicago, 351 F.3d 306,
317 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding police department liable for disparate impact be-
cause examination pass rates of minorities fell short of four-fifths rule); Boston
Police Superior Officers Fed’n v. City of Boston, 147 F.3d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 1998)
(using violation of four-fifths rule as one of many factors weighing into finding of
disparate impact); Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1379–80
(2d Cir. 1991) (finding violation of four-fifths rule, in combination with statistically
significant disparity, as sufficient demonstration of disparate impact); Firefighters
Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 616 F.2d 350, 356–57 (8th Cir.
1980) (utilizing four-fifths rule analysis in finding existence of disparate impact);
Craig v. Cnty. of L.A., 626 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that defending employ-
ment practices is more difficult where EEOC guidelines have not been followed);
Moore v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607, 608 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that no
disparate impact existed where pass rate for black applicants was 93% of pass rate
of white applicants).
66. See, e.g., Bradley v. City of Lynn, 433 F. Supp. 2d 157, 159 (D. Mass. 2006)
(finding violation of Title VII where passing scores of promotion test by minorities
were less than four-fifths of white test-takers). But see, e.g., Johnson v. City of Mem-
phis, Nos. 00-2608 DP, 04-2017 DP, 04-2013 DA, 2006 WL 3827481, at *21 (W.D.
Tenn. Dec. 28, 2006) (finding liability despite employer’s test satisfying four-fifths
rule), rev’d, 770 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2014).
67. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 781 (providing list of agencies that have
adopted four-fifths rule).  The Department of Labor, the Department of Justice,
and the Office of Personnel Management have adopted the rule as a measure of
disparate impact. See id.  The rule has also been adopted by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs. See ERIC M. DUNLEAVY, DCI CONSULTING GRP., A
CONSIDERATION OF PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN ADVERSE IMPACT ANALYSIS (July
2010), available at http://dciconsult.com/whitepapers/PracSig.pdf (noting that
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs has also adopted four-fifths
rule).
12
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Using the rule as a marker for disparate impact has some noted ad-
vantages, particularly its simplicity.68  Yet, despite being easy to under-
stand, the rule has been extensively criticized by both courts and scholars
alike as an improper measure of disparate impact.69  The greatest disad-
vantage is the rule’s impact on small employers: often times, the addition
or subtraction of a small number of employees will have a substantial im-
pact on the selection ratio between groups.70  Further, large disparities in
impact may still exist but remain undetectable because of the rule’s strict
cutoff.71  Such unreliable results and the noted weaknesses of the rule
have undoubtedly led to inconsistencies among the lower courts.72
3. Practical Significance
Another measure courts turn to when deciding disparate impact cases
is practical significance, an intuitive measure of substantive impor-
68. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 783 (describing simplicity as primary advan-
tage of four-fifths rule).
69. See, e.g., Clady v. Cnty. of L.A., 770 F.2d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1985)
(describing four-fifths rule as “ill-conceived” and capable of producing anomalous
results); Cormier v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 211, 255 (W.D. La. 1981)
(describing four-fifths rule as inappropriate test to determine disparate impact),
aff’d, 702 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1983); Scott W. McKinley, The Need for Legislative or
Judicial Clarity on the Four-Fifths Rule and How Employers in the Sixth Circuit Can Survive
the Ambiguity, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 171, 172 (2008) (describing four-fifths rule as
undermining purpose of Title VII); Elaine W. Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in
Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793, 805 (1978)
(advocating for rejection of four-fifths rule in all contexts).
70. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 784 (“[A] small employer with a small abso-
lute disparity . . . might face liability under the rule, while a large employer can
have a much greater disparity and still comply with the four-fifths rule.”); Shoben,
supra note 69, at 806–07 (performing four-fifths analysis and finding that selection
rate is more sensitive in small samples than in large ones).
71. See Richard E. Biddle, Disparate Impact Reference Trilogy for Statistics, LAB. L.J.
(1995), available at http://www.biddle.com/documents/disparatetrilogy.htm
(“Smaller differences in selection rate [i.e., differences within the 80 percent limit,
such as .81 or .95, etc.] may nevertheless constitute adverse impact, where they are
significant in both statistical and practical terms . . . .” (first alteration in original)).
Further, the question over the appropriate “selection rate” often leads to inconsis-
tent application of the rule. See, e.g., Council 31, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun.
Emps., AFL-CIO v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1992) (providing example of con-
fusion about selection rates).  In Council 31, the employee-plaintiffs presented evi-
dence that white employees were fired at 35% of the rate that black employees
were. See id. at 376.  Recognizing that this was in clear violation of the four-fifths
rule, the employer offered statistics regarding retention, rather than termination,
of employees, emphasizing that black employees were retained at 94% of the rate
that white employees were. See id. at 379.  The court adopted the plaintiffs’ presen-
tation of the statistics, but the case is an example of how both sides in litigation
attempt to frame the 80% requirement to their advantage.
72. See McKinley, supra note 69, at 176–77 (arguing that courts’ inconsistent
application of four-fifths rule should prevent use of rule as guideline for
employers).
13
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tance.73  A finding of practical significance means “the magnitude of the
effect being studied is not de minimis—it is sufficiently important substan-
tively for the court to be concerned.”74  Although it is not as well-defined
in the legal context as the standard deviation analysis or the four-fifths
rule, some courts have examined a proffered disparity with an eye toward
its real-world meaning.75  For example, the First Circuit impliedly ad-
dressed practical significance in Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher.76  In
Beecher, the First Circuit held that statistical evidence demonstrating that
African-American and Hispanic applicants performed worse on a multiple-
choice test than their white counterparts, in conjunction with other evi-
dence, could demonstrate a prima facie case of disparate impact.77  The
First Circuit expanded on this line of reasoning in Fudge v. City of Provi-
dence Fire Department,78 holding that the proper analysis in disparate impact
claims involves an “intuitive judicial judgment” as to the substantiality of a
statistically significant discrepancy.79
73. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 292
(3d ed. 2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/SciMan3D
01.pdf/$file/SciMan3D01.pdf (explaining practical significance).
74. Id. at 318; see also Hamer v. City of Atlanta, 872 F.2d 1521, 1524–26 (11th
Cir. 1989) (describing practical significance as “the degree to which test scores
relate to job performance”); Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implica-
tions of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29
HOFSTRA LAB & EMP. L.J. 433, 449 n.94 (2012) (“Practical significance refers to
whether the statistical differences are meaningful in the real world.”).
75. See Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1526 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
4.5% difference in selection rates was trivial where 95% of applicants were se-
lected); Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1379 (2d Cir. 1991)
(citing Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir.
1989)) (noting that courts should take case-by-case approach that considers both
statistical analyses and surrounding facts and circumstances); Bilingual Bicultural
Coal. on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 642 n.57 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Robin-
son, J., dissenting in part) (“[S]tatistical significance is not the same as practical
significance because in isolation it tells nothing about the importance or magni-
tude of the differences.”); NAACP v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 5-00-cv-100-Oc-10GRJ,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28348, at *54 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2004) (rejecting statistically
significant sample for lack of practical significance); Jones v. Pepsi-Cola Metro.
Bottling Co., 871 F. Supp. 305, 313 n.25 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (noting that employers
must demonstrate both statistical and practical significance in defending discrimi-
natory test).
76. 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974).
77. See id. at 1021 n.7 (explaining that other factors are useful in determining
validity of entrance exam).  The First Circuit explained that non-statistical evi-
dence, such as the fact that Boston firefighters were often recruited by relatives
and friends, can be probative in determining whether or not a standardized test
had an adverse impact on minority candidates. See id. (explaining that relatives
and friends do not “invalidate the test [but] they are merely additional reasons for
inquiring into its utility”).
78. 766 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1985).
79. See id. at 657–58 (holding that proffered statistical disparity was not suffi-
cient to establish prima facie case).  In Fudge, the plaintiffs offered evidence that a
lower percentage of black applicants had passed a screening test as compared to
white applicants, but they did not present any additional statistical analysis based
14
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A practical significance consideration typically takes place after a
plaintiff has introduced a statistical analysis that produced significant re-
sults.80  Though not binding on courts, the EEOC’s guidelines require evi-
dence of both statistical and practical significance in order to prove
disparate impact.81
One glaring difficulty in adopting a practical significance standard is
its lack of a solid definition.82  Another criticism comes in the form of
subjectivity; since there is no set definition of practical significance, courts
would have to perform a case-by-case analysis, which could lead to such
arbitrary results as the four-fifths rule.83  Though not directly adopted by
the Supreme Court, its line of cases surrounding the causation element of
the prima facie case has hinted at what amounts to a consideration of
practical significance.84
on those figures. See id. at 657.  The plaintiffs’ only evidence of disparate impact
was that 4% of black applicants and 13% of white applicants had passed the screen-
ing test. See id.
80. See United States v. City of N.Y., 637 F. Supp. 2d 77, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(holding that plaintiffs’ showing of statistical significance was bolstered by demon-
stration of practical significance); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp.
1265, 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“To determine the practical significance of statistical
results, a court must look at the theories and assumptions underlying the analysis
and apply common sense.”).
81. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1981) (requiring showing of both practical and
statistical significance).  The guidelines provide, in relevant part, that “[s]maller
differences in selection rate may nevertheless constitute adverse impact, where
they are significant in both statistical and practical terms or where a user’s actions
have discouraged applicants disproportionately on grounds of race, sex, or ethnic
group.” Id.
82. See DUNLEAVY, supra note 67, at 1–2 (noting difficulties in practical signifi-
cance standard).  Dunleavy, quoting an unpublished Office of Federal Contract
Compliance report, identifies two potential problems with practical significance as
a standard for disparate impact:
First, any standard of practical significance is arbitrary.  It is not rooted in
mathematics or statistics, but in a practical judgment as to the size of the
disparity from which it is reasonable to infer discrimination.  Second, no
single mathematical measure of practical significance will be suitable to
widely different factual settings.
Id. (quoting R. SOBEL ET AL., STATISTICAL INFERENCES OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION AND THE CALCULATION OF BACK PAY.  PART I: INFERENCES OF DISCRIMINATION
(1979) (unpublished OFCCP statistical standards panel report)).
Some courts have noted this as a fault so severe as not to adopt the standard.
See, e.g., Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 50 (1st Cir. 2014) (describing concept
of practical significance as incapable of being defined with precision and refusing
to adopt it as standard to demonstrate disparate impact).
83. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 192
n.34 (2d ed. 2000) (“There is no specific percentage threshold above which a re-
sult is practically significant. Practical significance must be evaluated in the context
of a particular legal issue.”); see also King, supra note 13, at 291 (“[T]he standard
for determining the sufficiency of statistical evidence should depend on the partic-
ular issue to which that evidence is addressed.”).
84. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 312 (1977) (not-
ing that appropriate comparison figures in statistical analysis must be evaluated
after further findings); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340
15
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Practical significance as a measure of disparate impact has several ad-
vantages.85  When combined with a statistical significance analysis, courts
can determine both the existence of a disparity and the consequences of
the disparity.86  Further, a practical significance analysis has the effect of
ruling out those cases where a statistically significant sample is mislabeled
as dispositive due to its large sample size.87  Although not capable of a
precise definition, scholars have noted the utility of adopting a practical
significance standard and have suggested several procedures for evaluat-
ing the practical significance of a statistically significant sample.88
(1977) (“We caution [ ] that statistics are not irrefutable; they come in infinite
variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted.  In short, their
usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.” (emphasis ad-
ded)); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995 n.3 (1988)
(plurality opinion) (recognizing that case-by-case approach is proper in determin-
ing significance of numerical disparities).
85. For a discussion of the advantages of adopting a practical significance
standard, see infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
86. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 790 (noting that statistical and practical anal-
yses serve two separate functions).
87. See Tinkham, supra note 57, at 362 (commenting on utility of practical
significance analysis).  Although a disparity of two or three standard deviations is
enough to raise an inference of discrimination, a statistical analysis does not deter-
mine whether that disparity is practically significant. See id.
88. See, e.g., Biddle, supra note 59 (noting advantages to practical significance
standard); DUNLEAVY, supra note 67, at 4–8 (arguing that practical significance is
appropriate standard for an adverse impact analysis).  One approach to quanti-
fying practical significance requires the analyst (whether it be the court or an ex-
pert witness) to add two people from the “unfavorable” status (such as failing a
drug test) to the “favorable” status (passing said test); if the change renders a once
statistically significant sample as insignificant, then the results would not be practi-
cally significant. See id. at 4–8 (proposing approach). But see Kevin R. Murphy &
Rick R. Jacobs, Using Effect Size Measures to Reform the Determination of Adverse Impact
in Equal Employment Litigation, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 477, 483 (2012) (sug-
gesting that this method provides only marginal protection from trivial claims).
Other scholars have suggested using difference in selection rates as a measure of
practical significance. See, e.g., Peresie, supra note 40, at 801 (advocating for adop-
tion of difference in selection rates as appropriate measure of practical signifi-
cance).  Peresie argues that “disparities with the same absolute magnitude should
matter the same amount.” Id.  Under this theory, a selection rate of 15% men and
10% women would indicate the same disparate impact as a rate of 75% men and
70% women. See id.
The social sciences have also recently adopted a showing of practical signifi-
cance as necessary to validate studies, and they have considered a failure to do so a
deficiency, although no precise definition exists in that sphere of academia. See,
e.g., DUNLEAVY, supra note 67, at 6 (citing Sheldon Zedeck, Instructions for Authors,
88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 35 (2003)) (requiring authors to provide, among other
things, showing of practical significance).
16
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III. “YOU’RE OUT OF HERE!”: THE FIRST CIRCUIT EXPLICITLY REJECTS THE
PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE REQUIREMENT IN
JONES V. CITY OF BOSTON
In Jones, the First Circuit refused to consider practical concerns re-
garding the probative value of statistical evidence.89  The court’s holding
turned on its acceptance of statistical evidence as sufficient to demonstrate
a prima facie case.90  In reaching its holding, the court discounted the
reasoning of the district court and refused to accept any practical consid-
erations of the plaintiffs’ proffered statistically significant sample.91
A. Covering the Bases: Facts and Procedure
In 1999, the Boston Police Department (the “Department”) began an-
nually testing officers and cadets for illicit drug use.92  Specifically, the
Department utilized a hair test to detect the existence of five different
illegal drugs.93  Officers and cadets who failed the drug test were offered a
second, more sensitive hair test and a medical review to determine if the
first test was inaccurate.94  If neither of these steps exonerated offenders,
the officers were given the option to remain at the Department so long as
they agreed to seek rehabilitative treatment for drug abuse and accept a
forty-five day unpaid suspension; if not, the offending officer or cadet was
terminated, and any conditional offer of employment to a recruit would
be withdrawn.95
The plaintiffs were all black officers, applicants, and cadets who tested
positive for the use of cocaine and failed the hair drug test.96  They al-
leged that the Department’s drug test violated Title VII because it caused a
89. For a thorough discussion of the Jones decision, see infra notes 92–126 and
accompanying text.
90. For a discussion on the First Circuit’s reasoning regarding statistical evi-
dence, see infra notes 102–13 and accompanying text.
91. For a discussion on the First Circuit’s rejection of the four-fifths rule and
practical significance standard, see infra notes 114–26 and accompanying text.
92. See Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2014) (describing
Department’s drug testing policy).  The drug test also applied to job applicants,
who would have to consent to a drug test after a conditional offer of employment
was extended to them. See id.
93. See id. (listing drugs that Department tested for).  The drugs the Depart-
ment tested for were cocaine, marijuana, opiates, PCP, and amphetamines. See id.
94. See id. (explaining “exculpatory” remedies after failed initial drug test).
95. See id. (describing options given to officers upon failed drug test and lack
of exculpation).  If officers or cadets refused to accept the Department’s offer of
therapy and suspension, they would be terminated. See id. (noting Department’s
rationale for firing officers or cadets).  Massachusetts law required that terminated
employees be provided with a written notice of reasons for their termination. See
id.  An evidentiary hearing followed, at which officers could argue that they were
terminated without cause. See id.
96. See id. at 42–43 (describing plaintiffs).  The plaintiffs included seven for-
mer officers fired by the Department, one former cadet who had been fired, one
cadet who opted to undergo rehabilitation, and one former applicant. See id. at 41.
17
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disparate impact on the basis of their race.97  Although only a small num-
ber of black and white officers and cadets tested positive for cocaine be-
tween 1999 and 2006, black officers and cadets tested positive for cocaine
at a higher rate than did their white colleagues.98  The district court
granted summary judgment to the Department on all claims, holding that
the plaintiffs’ proffered statistics, while statistically significant, were not
practically significant and thus were insufficient to make a prima facie
showing of racial discrimination.99
B. That’s a Balk!: The First Circuit’s Reasoning in Jones
In reversing the district court’s judgment, the First Circuit described
the disparate impact analysis in conjunction with its views on the concept
of statistical significance, and it applied those theories to the case at
hand.100  The court then rejected the district court’s reasoning and held
that Title VII did not require a showing of practical significance as to a
plaintiff’s statistically significant sample.101
1. “Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics”
The First Circuit began its analysis by briefly summarizing the dispa-
rate impact framework.102  The court explained that, in order to make a
prima facie showing of disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff must
identify a specific employment practice that the employer actually uses
and show that the identified practice causes a disparate impact on the ba-
97. See id. (providing background of plaintiffs’ claims).  The plaintiffs also
brought claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and for failure to train and supervise under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 55–60.  This Note will only discuss and analyze the dispa-
rate impact claim.
98. See id. at 42–43 (describing rates and numbers at which officers and cadets
tested positive for cocaine).  Black applicants tested positive for cocaine at both a
higher percentage and a higher total number than whites. See id. at 43.  Over the
eight years the Department utilized the test, fifty-five black officers tested positive
for cocaine as opposed to thirty white officers, even though there were over 6,000
more white officers tested during that time. See id. at 44.  Black officers tested
positive for cocaine at a 1.3% rate, while white officers tested positive 0.3% of the
time. See id. at 43–44.
99. See id. at 41 (providing district court’s holding); see also Jones v. City of
Boston, No. 05-11832-Gao, 2012 WL 4530594, at *3–6 (D. Mass. Sept. 28, 2012)
(detailing district court’s reasoning).
100. See Jones, 752 F.3d at 42–45 (providing background on statistical analysis
and implications of finding statistical significance); id. at 46–48 (analyzing statisti-
cally significant correlation in plaintiffs’ proffered sample).
101. See id. at 53 (providing First Circuit’s holding).  The court held that a
practical significance standard would be too difficult to articulate in a “principled
and predictable manner,” and that failing to establish practical significance cannot
preclude a plaintiff from proving a prima facie case of disparate impact. Id.
102. See id. at 46 (“Title VII prohibits employers from utilizing ‘employment
practices that cause [ ] a disparate impact on the basis of race’ . . . .” (first altera-
tion in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012))).
18
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sis of race.103  Much of the court’s analysis focused on the second step by
noting that a disparate impact analysis essentially boils down to whether a
plaintiff can offer a statistically significant disparity at the prima facie
level.104
The First Circuit explained the significance of statistical analyses in
proving the causal link between the employment practice and the alleged
disparate impact.105  Referencing Mark Twain’s famous quip that, “there
are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics,” the court rejected
the notion that the parties’ various briefs would be of any use in interpret-
ing the meaning of a statistical analysis, and it instead gave deference to
the objective, precise calculations of statisticians.106  Though statistical sig-
nificance can be assessed by a variety of methods, the court deemed that a
type of test known as a probability analysis was the most relevant for its
present purposes.107  A probability analysis, the court described, deter-
mines the likelihood that a given sample was the result of chance, assum-
ing that in a perfect world, both groups would receive equal treatment.108
103. See id. (“[A] plaintiff starts by ‘isolating and identifying’ the employment
practice being challenged.” (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion))); see also id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i)) (describing second step of establishing prima facie case).
104. See id. (“[A] prima facie showing of disparate impact [is] ‘essentially a
threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity . . . and nothing more.’” (sec-
ond alteration in original) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587
(2009))); see also id. (“[A] prima facie case of disparate impact can be established
where ‘statistical tests sufficiently diminish chance as a likely explanation.’” (quot-
ing Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dep’t, 766 F.2d 650, 658 n.8 (1st Cir. 1985))).
105. See id. at 43–45 (giving court’s summation of statistical significance and
its application to case at hand).
106. See id. at 43 (giving deference to precise approach of statisticians).  The
court posited that, without any expertise in statistical analysis, the parties would be
unable to persuade the court of the actual meaning of a statistical test and only
offered “unhelpful types of competing characterizations of the numbers.” Id.  The
court made clear its preference for a statistician’s precise approach, whereby it may
be determined whether a correlation between an employment practice and race
exists, and if it does, whether that correlation exists as a product of chance. See id.;
see also MARK TWAIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK TWAIN 195 (Charles Neider ed.,
2000) (“Figures often beguile me, particularly when I have the arranging of them
myself . . .  There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.”).  The
court referenced part of the foregoing passage, which appropriately set the tone
for the remainder of the court’s analysis. See Jones, 752 F.3d at 43.
107. See Jones, 752 F.3d at 43 (citing Paul Meier, Jerome Sacks & Sandy L.
Zabell, What Happened in Hazelwood: Statistics, Employment Discrimination, and the
80% Rule, 1984 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 139, 147 (1984)) (noting court’s
reasoning for probability analysis).  The court framed the probability test to the
facts of Jones to illustrate its usefulness in assessing statistical significance. See id.
(“In the approach most relevant here, statisticians may compare outcomes for two
different groups (e.g., black employees and white employees) presuming that
members of the two groups have the same likelihood of receiving a given outcome
(e.g., a promotion).”).
108. See id. (observing that assumption of equal opportunity does not necessi-
tate actual equal outcomes).  The court noted that random variation may cause
differences in a given outcome, and that the purpose of performing a probability
19
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The court observed that when statisticians employ this test, they will deem
results statistically significant if certain criteria are met, specifically if the
tested sample deviates a certain amount from the expected outcome.109
Statisticians, the court noted, will reject the idea that the disparity between
the groups was caused by chance when the probability test produces statis-
tically significant results.110
Applying this framework to the case at hand, the First Circuit found
that the plaintiffs’ proffered analysis was statistically significant.111  Despite
confessing its uncertainty as to whether to consider the data aggregated
over eight years as a single sample, the court nevertheless held that it
could “be almost certain that the difference in outcomes associated with
race over that period cannot be attributed to chance alone.”112  The court
then overruled several secondary objections raised by the Department, the
most notable of which questioned the plaintiffs’ aggregation of data in its
proffered statistical analysis.113
analysis is to determine the likelihood that the difference from the expected out-
come was the result of random chance. See id. (citing FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra
note 73, at 251).  The probability of observing a difference equal to or greater than
that which actually occurred is known as the “p-value.” See id. at 43–44.  Courts
generally accept a p-value of 5% as evidence of statistical significance. See id. (cit-
ing Fudge, 766 F.2d at 658 n.8).
109. See id. (describing concept of standard deviation).  Standard deviation
serves as a measure of the amount by which the given sample differs from an out-
come resulting from equal opportunity. See id. at 44 (citing Fudge, 766 F.2d at 658
n.8).  A standard deviation of 1.96 is equivalent to a p-value of 0.5 and is the level at
which courts will recognize statistical significance. See id. (citing Castaneda v. Par-
tida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977)) (noting correlation between standard devia-
tion, p-value, and statistical significance).  The Supreme Court noted in Castaneda
that “[a]s a general rule for such large samples, if the difference between the ex-
pected value and the observed number is greater than two or three standard devia-
tions, then the hypothesis . . . [of randomness] would be suspect to a social
scientist.” Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 496 n.17.
110. See Jones, 752 F.3d at 43 (“Essentially, a finding of statistical significance
means that the data casts serious doubt on the assumption that the disparity was
caused by chance.”).
111. See id. at 44 (providing plaintiffs’ statistical analysis).  The court noted
that the presented analysis did not indicate whether the difference in outcomes
was, on its face, large, but it indicated the extent to which the outcomes were
attributed to something other than chance. See id. at 45 (“[T]he difference in
outcomes associated with race over [the eight-year] period cannot be attributed to
chance alone.”).
112. Id. (emphasis added).  The court also noted that randomness could not
be viewed as anything but “a very unlikely explanation for results in at least three
of the years viewed in isolation.” Id.
113. See id. at 47 (describing Department’s objections).  The Department’s
concern over aggregation stemmed from the fact that many individual officers had
been tested in several of the years given in the sample, which called into question
the assumption that the test results for different years were independent events.
See id.  The court rejected this argument, noting that a demonstration that the
plaintiffs’ analysis was skewed would be too complex. See id. at 48 n.11 (determin-
ing that Department’s analysis would “implicat[e] such factors as layoff and hiring
practices and the probability that a person who tested negative in one year will test
20
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2. Picked Off: The First Circuit Rejects the Practical Significance Standard
Most significantly, the First Circuit rejected the Department’s argu-
ment that Title VII requires a plaintiff to prove that a statistically signifi-
cant sample also is practically significant in order to demonstrate a prima
facie case.114  The court began by acknowledging that several of the De-
partment’s arguments regarding sample size had merit, conceding that
the larger the sample size, the more likely it is that even small differences
between groups can be statistically significant.115  Further, the court recog-
nized that statisticians regularly assess the practical significance of large,
statistically significant samples due to the problems associated with those
outcomes.116  The court also referenced the EEOC’s guidelines, which it
described as being “reasonably read as interpreting Title VII to include a
practical significance requirement.”117
Despite its willingness to concede these logical points brought up by
the Department, the court forcefully rejected a practical significance re-
quirement.118  The court’s first concern with such a requirement was a
lack of any objective measure of practical significance, expressing appre-
hension at the idea of courts applying an “elusive, know-it-when-you-see-it
standard.”119  The First Circuit next took the four-fifths rule to task, point-
ing out several flaws with using the rule as a measure of practical signifi-
negative in a later year, as compared to the probability of a negative result for
someone first tested in the later year”).
114. See id. at 48 (rejecting Department’s central argument).  The district
court had adopted the Department’s argument, holding that the plaintiffs could
not establish a prima facie case based solely on a showing of two or more standard
deviations in failure rates. See Jones v. City of Boston, No. 05-11832-Gao, 2012 WL
4530594, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 28, 2012) (“For these reasons, the defendants are
correct that the plaintiffs have not satisfied the first step in making out a prima
facie case.”).
115. See Jones, 752 F.3d at 48–49 (discussing problematic connection between
statistical significance and large sample sizes).  The court provided a useful exam-
ple regarding large sample size and statistical significance:
For example, if you were to flip a coin a million times, and the coin were
to land on tails exactly 50.1% of the time, the deviation from the ex-
pected result of 50% tails and 50% heads would be statistically significant,
even though it amounts to just one flip per thousand.
Id. at 49.
116. See id. (“[S]tatisticians acknowledge that not all statistically significant re-
sults are practically significant, meaning ‘practically meaningful or important.’”
(quoting Xitao Fan, Statistical Significance and Effect Size in Education Research: Two
Sides of a Coin, 94 J. EDUC. RESEARCH 275, 277 (2001))).
117. See id. at 50.  The court noted that the federal regulation that created the
four-fifths rule considers both practical and statistical significance as relevant in
determining whether disparate impact exists. See id. (discussing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4(D)).
118. See id. at 50–53 (rejecting Department’s main argument).
119. See id. at 50–51 (discussing lack of objective measure of practical signifi-
cance).  The court described the concept of practical significance as “impossible to
define in even a remotely precise manner.” Id. at 50.
21
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cance.120  Although other courts often use the four-fifths rule as a “rule of
thumb,” the court noted that the Supreme Court and the EEOC have
questioned the rule as a decisive tool.121  Further, the court found the rule
to be flawed because it can lead to inconsistent results depending on how
it is interpreted.122  Although the court recognized that the four-fifths rule
may serve important goals in contexts outside of the courtroom, it dis-
missed the Department’s reliance on the rule as a measure of practical
significance.123
Similarly, the court recognized that, although there may be some
“theoretical benefits” to requiring a showing of practical significance, it
would simply be too difficult to define or enforce such a standard in any
“principled and predictable manner.”124  Because it could not find an ac-
ceptably accurate measure of practical significance, the court chose to sim-
ply discard the requirement altogether.125  The court concluded its
analysis by suggesting that plaintiffs must fulfill other requirements in
proving a disparate impact case that indirectly satisfy the benefits a practi-
cal significance standard would yield.126
120. See id. at 51–53 (describing flaws of four-fifths rule).
121. See id. at 51 (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995
(1988) (plurality opinion)). But see id. (citing Adoption of Questions and Answers
to Clarify and Provide a Common Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 11996, 11998 (Mar. 2, 1979)) (not-
ing that four-fifths rule was not meant to be legal definition or controlling in all
circumstances).  The First Circuit also noted its own reluctance to rely on the rule
in a past disparate impact case. See id. (citing Fudge v. City of Providence Fire
Dep’t, 766 F.2d 650, 658 n.10 (1st Cir. 1985)) (describing four-fifths rule as inaccu-
rate test of discriminatory impact).  In Fudge, the court noted that the 4% passage
rate of black applicants, as compared to the 13% passage rate of white applicants,
fell well short of the four-fifths rule’s requirements, but it rejected the rule as a
measure of impact because the sample size was too small. See Fudge, 766 F.2d at
656, 658 n.10 (noting that sample size of 248 applicants was not large enough to
justify use of four-fifths rule).
122. See Jones, 752 F.3d at 51–52 (highlighting several flaws with four-fifths
rule).  The Jones court pointed out that a given sample may be deemed to meet the
four-fifths requirement depending on which “selection rate” is chosen by the statis-
tician; choosing a selection rate at which employees pass a test, as opposed to the
rate at which employees fail a test, may lead to an entirely different conclusion. See
id. at 52.  Further, the court took issue with the rule’s strict 80% requirement,
explaining that a court implementing the rule would put no greater weight on a
policy that leads to termination of 100 in 900 black employees than it would to a
policy that leads to the termination of one in nine black employees. See id.
123. See id. (rejecting application of four-fifths rule to determine practical sig-
nificance of statistically significant sample).
124. Id. at 53.  Having rejected the four-fifths rule, the court decided that
there was no other mathematical measure of practical significance available for its
consideration. See id. (“Ultimately, we find any theoretical benefits of inquiring as
to practical significance outweighed by the difficulty of doing so in practice in any
principled and predictable manner.”).
125. See id.
126. See id. (describing existing requirements imposed by Title VII on plain-
tiffs in disparate impact cases).  The court construed the need for plaintiffs to show
statistical significance as a filter that would preclude “small impacts” from making
22
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IV. SWING AND A MISS: THE FIRST CIRCUIT FAILED TO EXAMINE
PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
In Jones, the First Circuit had the opportunity to set forth a new stan-
dard in disparate impact claims, but it instead fell into the same trap that
courts have fallen into over the past thirty years: placing too much empha-
sis on a finding of statistical significance, while overlooking or ignoring
the statistics’ practical meaning.127
The first misstep the court made was disregarding the potential influ-
ence of other circuit courts and scholarship on the subject, as the court
dismissed case law from other circuits as “sparse” and unclear.128  The
court’s claim is simply incorrect.129  Several courts have adopted a require-
ment of showing practical significance, which is typically added as a sec-
ond tier of analysis in conjunction with statistical evidence.130  Further, it
is well-established in the study of statistics that a showing of statistical sig-
nificance is not dispositive, particularly when dealing with large sample
sizes, as was the case in Jones.131  Moreover, the First Circuit implied that
the concepts of statistical significance and practical significance are mutu-
ally exclusive, when, in fact, they are intertwined and most beneficial when
used in tandem.132
The First Circuit also erred in misinterpreting its own precedent on
practical significance.133  Although the court has not explicitly addressed
it past the prima facie stage, because proving statistical significance with a small
impact requires attaining often-unavailable large sample sizes. See id.  Further, the
court felt confident that the consequent steps in a disparate impact case would give
a defendant ample opportunity to weed out insignificant or otherwise justifiable
claims of impact. See id. (“[E]ven in cases like this one, in which the data is availa-
ble, the subsequent steps required to successfully recover on a disparate impact
theory offer an additional safeguard.”).  Having rejected the Department’s propo-
sal for a practical significance requirement, the First Circuit reversed the district
court’s decision. See id. at 60 (“The plaintiffs have proven beyond reasonable dis-
pute a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII . . . .”).
127. For an in-depth discussion of the court’s refusal to adopt a practical sig-
nificance standard, see infra notes 128–43 and accompanying text.
128. See Jones, 752 F.3d at 50 (labeling case law from other federal circuit
courts as “sparse” and unable to offer answers as to practical significance
standard).
129. For a discussion of case law from other courts examining practical signif-
icance, see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d
Cir. 1991) (holding that case-by-case analysis of all facts and circumstances sur-
rounding statistical disparities is appropriate consideration).
131. For a discussion of scholarship advocating for a practical significance
standard, see supra note 88.
132. See Jones, 752 F.3d at 53 (holding that plaintiffs’ evidence of statistical
significance was sufficient to establish prima facie case where no demonstration of
practical significance was made).  The court also spoke of practical significance as
“trump[ing] a showing of statistical significance,” implying that the court viewed
the two concepts as competing, not complimentary, considerations. Id. at 52.
133. For a discussion on the First Circuit’s misinterpretation of its own prece-
dent, see infra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
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“practical significance” as a standard, prior First Circuit cases can be read
as having already deployed such an analysis in the disparate impact con-
text.134  In Beecher, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ use of “other
evidence” in support of a disparate impact claim may be highly rele-
vant.135  The First Circuit later expanded on the Beecher ruling in Fudge,
where it held that the appropriate analysis in disparate impact claims in-
cludes consideration of both statistical and practical evidence.136  District
courts within the First Circuit have also applied a similar analysis.137
The court also misinterpreted the four-fifths rule as being the only
viable measure of practical significance.138  Though the court noted that
there are no other mathematical measures of practical significance, it failed
to recognize that not all evidence in the employment discrimination con-
text must be mathematical in nature.139  Although the four-fifths rule has
been widely criticized, it is not the only measure of practical significance;
as illustrated above, there are several suggestions on how to consistently
calculate practical significance.140  In Jones, the defendant’s expert witness
offered such a suggestion to determine practical significance, but the First
Circuit dismissed the recommendation without addressing it.141
134. For a discussion of prior First Circuit cases considering practical signifi-
cance, see supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
135. See Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1021 n.7
(1st Cir. 1974) (holding that other evidence may be probative where proffered
sample size is small).
136. See Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dep’t, 766 F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir.
1985) (rejecting four-fifths rule as proper analytical tool where plaintiff offered no
statistical evidence as to alleged disparity).  In an important passage, the court held
that: “In a case involving a claim . . . [of] disparate and adverse impact . . . the
initial inquiry must be whether there is a discrepancy in the rate of passage . . . .  If
so, an intuitive judicial judgment must next be made whether the discrepancy is sub-
stantial.” Id. (emphasis added).
137. See, e.g., Bradley v. City of Lynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d 145, 164 (D. Mass. 2006)
(examining statewide aggregated data against localized data to determine practical
significance of varying outcomes).
138. See Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 52 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Our rejection
of the four-fifths rule as suitable to trump a showing of statistical significance leaves
us with no statute, regulation, or case law proposing any other mathematical mea-
sure of practical significance.”).
139. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1353 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) (holding that statistical disparities in hiring between men and women
were attributed externally to women’s lack of interest rather than to internal dis-
criminatory motive).  In systemic disparate treatment cases, courts frequently take
other, non-mathematical considerations into account when determining liability.
See Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 417 (2011) (commenting that statistical evidence of disparities
is probative, but not dispositive, in employment discrimination context).
140. For a discussion of proposed methods for determining practical signifi-
cance, see supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
141. See Expert Report of Dr. Kathleen K. Lundquist at 4, Jones v. City of
Boston, No. 05-11832-Gao, 2012 WL 4530594 (D. Mass. Mar. 13, 2009), 2009 WL
8754866 (relying on EEOC Uniform Guidelines and applying statistical and practi-
cal significance tests).  Lundquist, the defendant’s expert witness, demonstrated in
24
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Finally, the court’s reasoning is overly broad in that it rejects the need
for a showing of practical significance altogether.142  This holding flies in
the face of supporting academic literature, and it defies sound logic pro-
posed by other courts that the First Circuit seemed to simply ignore.143
V. INSTANT REPLAY: PROPOSAL OF A TWO-PART SIGNIFICANCE FRAMEWORK
AND HOW JONES SHOULD HAVE PLAYED OUT
Jones illustrates the need for a new framework in disparate impact
analysis that adequately accounts for statistical and practical concerns.144
Such a framework would more accurately address the concerns of Title VII
by screening out employment practices that actually have a discriminatory
effect on a given class.145  Had the First Circuit used a framework that
incorporated concerns of practical effects, the outcome in Jones would
have been different.146
A. Let’s Play Two!: A New Approach to Disparate Impact
Although the four-fifths rule may be a poor method of measuring dis-
parate impact, the EEOC did accurately assess the need for some considera-
tion of practical significance.147  Statistical significance and practical
significance separately are useful tools to determine the existence of dispa-
rate impact.148  However useful they may be, the two standards share a
weakness: they both, individually, only measure one of two important in-
her report that in an analysis using a sample size as large as the entire Boston
Police Department, statistical significance tests may have no practical significance.
See id. at 3–4.  By way of example, Lundquist provided the following hypothetical
situation: “For instance, if 100% of white officers passed the Hair Drug Test in
2000, a pass rate of 99.4% [of black officers] would have been identified as statisti-
cally significant.” Id.
142. For a discussion of the need for a practical significance standard in dis-
parate impact cases, see supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
143. For a discussion of academic support for practical significance and other
courts’ analyses of the standard, see supra notes 73–88 and accompanying text.
144. For a critical analysis of Jones, see supra notes 127–43 and accompanying
text.
145. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 792 (arguing that two-prong test at prima
facie stage would more accurately measure existence of impact).  For a discussion
of a proposed two-part framework incorporating practical significance at the prima
facie stage, see infra notes 147–65 and accompanying text.
146. For a discussion of the proposed two-part framework as applied to Jones,
see infra notes 166–76 and accompanying text.
147. See Murphy & Jacobs, supra note 88, at 486 (advocating for federal en-
forcement agencies to define disparate-impact theory with both statistical signifi-
cance and practical significance in mind); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact
Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1323 (1987)
(noting that plaintiffs’ burden in demonstrating disparate impact should require
more than statistically significant analysis).
148. See DUNLEAVY, supra note 67, at 4–8 (discussing benefits of using statisti-
cal significance and practical significance in conjunction).
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quiries in disparate impact cases.149  On the one hand, statistical signifi-
cance allows plaintiffs to demonstrate that a particular practice causes
some disparity between classes (the “disparate” prong of the inquiry); on
the other, practical significance determines if that disparity is large
enough to have real-world implications (the “impact” prong of the in-
quiry).150  Practices that do in fact create a noticeable disparate impact
would implicate both of these considerations.151
The first step that courts should take under this new framework
would be very familiar; as to statistical significance, courts should continue
to employ the standard deviation analysis as a tool to determine if a dispar-
ity actually exists.152  As part of the first step, plaintiffs would be required
to demonstrate that a disparity exists that is at least two standard deviations
from the outcome that assumes equal opportunity.153  This disparity is
large enough to give a sample probative value because, as described above,
two standard deviations is equivalent to a showing that the demonstrated
disparity would occur as a result of random chance only one in twenty
times.154  Defendants would be able to continue to attack the statistical
analysis and question the methods used or the sample size analyzed.155
149. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 790 (describing tests as problematic when
used individually).
150. See id. at 790–91.
151. See Rutherglen, supra note 147, at 1324 (noting that employment prac-
tices that create great adverse impact likely serve as pretexts for discrimination and
deny equality of opportunity).
152. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 792–93 (arguing that courts should con-
tinue to utilize standard deviation as measure of disparity).  Retaining the same
analytical tool carries several advantages. See id.  The standard deviation analysis is,
compared to other statistical analyses, relatively easy to understand. See Kaye, supra
note 11, at 1337 (noting that concept of statistical significance is “easily grasped”).
Further, it is well-engrained in disparate impact case law nationwide; courts would
have no difficulty keeping a standard in place that they have already used for more
than forty years. See supra notes 41–61 and accompanying text.
153. See Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 362–63 (7th Cir.
2001) (describing problems with using lower or higher p-value to determine signif-
icance).  Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, observed:
A lower significance level may show that the correlation is spurious, but
may also be a result of “noise” in the data or collinearity . . . and such
evidence, when corroborated by other evidence, need not be deemed
worthless.  Conversely, a high significance level may be a misleading arti-
fact of the study’s design; and there is always the risk that . . . in the
circumstances, it was a chance result with no actual evidentiary
significance.
Id. at 362.
154. For a discussion on the standard deviation analysis and levels of signifi-
cance, see supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
155. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 778 (describing shift of burden of proof to
employer).  If a plaintiff can offer a statistically significant disparity, the defendant
can then attempt to rebut the plaintiff’s statistical evidence or demonstrate that
the questioned employment practice is job-related and consistent with business
necessity. See id.
26
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If plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that a statistically significant dis-
parity exists as a result of an employment practice, they should then be
required to show that this disparity is practically significant.156  As the
court in Jones observed, practical significance is a difficult concept to de-
fine in any concrete manner.157  However, various methods exist for deter-
mining practical significance that plaintiffs and defendants alike could use
to persuade a court, much in the same way the four-fifths rule has been
used in courts in the past.158  Courts should nevertheless discredit the
four-fifths rule as a viable measure of disparate impact altogether due to its
well-established history of inconsistent results.159  Although a “know-it-
when-you-see-it” approach should be avoided, the particular nature of sta-
tistical analysis may lend itself to a “case-by-case” analysis or an “intuitive
judicial judgment.”160  Until Congress or the Supreme Court adopts a new
standard for practical significance, or until the EEOC provides a more co-
herent and consistently-applicable measure, courts may have to develop
the standard through the common law.161  Used in conjunction, the two
tests will more accurately weed out those employment practices that are
causing actual discrimination, and they will also prevent unjust findings of
156. See id. at 802 (advocating for adoption of two-part test for significance at
prima facie stage in disparate impact claims).
157. For a discussion on the difficulty in defining practical significance pre-
cisely, see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
158. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 799–800 (proposing three methods for es-
tablishing practical significance).  Courts might utilize a method similar to the
four-fifths rule, but use the fail rate instead of the pass rate in comparing selection
ratios. See id. at 799 (“One way to minimize this problem is to use the fail ratio
instead of the pass ratio when the selection rates are very low.”).  Or, plaintiffs
could be required to show that the difference in selection rates, not the ratio be-
tween the rates, establishes practical significance. See id. (noting that courts “could
require plaintiffs to show that the difference was equal to, or greater than, a speci-
fied number of percentage points in the selection rate to establish practical signifi-
cance”).  Alternatively, defendants could demonstrate lack of practical significance
by showing that subtracting a specified number of people from the disfavored
group and adding them to the favored group discredits the significance of a statis-
tical analysis. See id. at 800 (“If the addition of a certain number of persons to the
pass group of the minority eliminates any statistically significant disparity, then the
disparity is not practically significant.”).
159. For a description of problems with the four-fifths rule, see supra notes
69–72 and accompanying text.
160. See Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1379 (2d Cir.
1991) (citing Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y. at New Paltz, 875 F.2d 365, 371 (2d
Cir. 1989)) (noting that courts should take case-by-case approach that considers
both statistical analyses and surrounding facts and circumstances in determining if
disparate impact occurred); Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dep’t, 766 F.2d 650,
657 (1st Cir. 1985) (applying “intuitive judicial judgment” as proper mechanism
for analyzing substantiality of established statistical discrepancy).
161. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 802 (recognizing necessity for practical and
statistical significance tests and noting that choosing proper standard is “policy-
laden decision”). But see Rutherglen, supra note 147, at 1330 (advocating that
courts should establish modest threshold that includes consideration of practical
significance).
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discrimination against employers whose tests or other employment prac-
tices have no practically-meaningful impact on different classes.
Though this two-tiered approach has several benefits, it does have
some potential weaknesses as well.162  First, it very obviously increases the
plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima facie case; plaintiffs very rarely
win disparate impact claims as it is, and this added burden would surely
screen out previously-acceptable claims.163  Secondly, there is scholarship
that indicates that the standard deviation analysis may not, in fact, be the
most accurate statistical measure of impact.164  However, until some mea-
sure of significance is suggested by the Supreme Court or is codified by
Congress, the approach proposed above would still allow suits that actually
identify discriminatory practices and policies to proceed.165
B. Double Play: New Standard as Applied to Jones
The First Circuit erred in Jones v. City of Boston by not requiring the
plaintiffs to show that their statistically significant sample was also practi-
cally significant.166  But, what if the court had embraced practical signifi-
cance as a measure of impact—would the outcome have changed at all?167
162. For a discussion of weaknesses of the two-tiered approach, see infra notes
163–65 and accompanying text.
163. See Selmi, supra note 6, at 739–40 (reporting that plaintiffs win about
25.1% of disparate impact cases at trial in federal district courts); see also Kevin M.
Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court:
From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 103–04 (2009) (describing how
plaintiffs win low proportion of cases at trial).  Plaintiffs in federal employment
discrimination cases also generally have a difficult time resolving cases pretrial. See
id. at 111 (noting lack of success for plaintiffs pretrial).  They also win a low per-
centage of cases at trial and, when they do, are often overturned on appeal. See id.
at 109–11 (providing statistics for plaintiffs’ success rates at trial).
164. See, e.g., Murphy & Jacobs, supra note 88, at 486–87 (advocating for sev-
eral different methods of determining impact).  One such method would be to
evaluate the difference between groups in terms of pooled deviations. See id. at
487 (noting that pooled deviations would “express[ ] the difference between
groups in terms of the number of standard deviations that separate [the groups’]
average scores”).  This method would produce a d value, which would range on the
low end from zero (no impact) to one (large impact). See id.  Another potential
method would be to evaluate the percentage of variance explained by differences
between the groups being compared:
If, for example, differences between men and women explain less than
1% of the variance in selection decisions, that figure will have the same
meaning and the same implications regardless of the sample size. . . .  PV
values of .01, .05, .15, .20, respectively, are widely used to describe small,
medium, moderately large, and large effects in the social and behavioral
sciences.
Id.
165. See Peresie, supra note 40, at 792 (arguing that two-prong test at prima
facie stage would more accurately measure existence of impact).
166. For an analysis of the First Circuit’s holding in Jones, see supra notes
100–26 and accompanying text.
167. For an application of the two-part test to the facts of Jones, see infra notes
168–76 and accompanying text.
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Applying the proposed two-part test to the facts of Jones reveals several
holes in the court’s reasoning.168  Under this new framework, the first part
of the plaintiffs’ prima facie case—offering statistical evidence at or above
the two standard deviation threshold—would be satisfied.169
The second step in the proposed analysis, that would require plain-
tiffs to demonstrate practical significance, is where the most obvious diver-
gences from the court’s holding are evident.170  Had the court taken
practical significance into consideration, it would have had to more thor-
oughly examine the aggregation issue raised by the defendants.171  Al-
though that specific argument was deemed not to have been properly
preserved upon appeal to the First Circuit, the Department could have
also attacked the plaintiffs’ aggregated data on the basis that the impact
rose to an actionable level in only three of the eight years included in the
sample.172  It was only in the aggregate that the plaintiffs’ sample seemed
to shock the court into finding evidence of disparate impact.173  In the
same vein, had the court taken into account the sheer size of the sample
168. For a discussion of the flaws in the Jones court’s reasoning, see infra notes
169–76 and accompanying text.
169. See Jones v. City of Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2014) (displaying
table of plaintiffs’ statistical analysis).  In Jones, the plaintiffs’ proffered statistical
sample proved, in the aggregate, that the actual result was 7.14 standard deviations
away from the expected norm, well above the necessary showing. See id. at 44 n.8
(providing sample’s “standard deviation of 7.14 for all years combined is far
greater than the average of the standard deviations in the individual years”).
170. For an application of the second part of the test to the facts of Jones, see
infra notes 171–76 and accompanying text.
171. See Jones, 752 F.3d at 48 (detailing defendant’s argument regarding ag-
gregation of eight years of data); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text.
172. See Jones, 752 F.3d at 44–45 (presenting plaintiffs’ proffered statistical
data).  In 1999, 2002, and 2003, the standard deviations between the actual and
expected outcomes were 3.43, 4.41, and 2.01, respectively, which would be large
enough disparities to be actionable on their own. See id. at 44.  However, in the
other five years in the sample, the standard deviation analysis did not produce
statistically significant results, although some disparity did exist in all those years.
See id.
173. See id. at 45 (providing court’s stance on plaintiffs’ statistical data).  The
First Circuit acknowledged its uncertainty in dealing with the aggregated data, but
still accepted the analysis as appropriate:
To the extent the facts make it appropriate to consider the eight-year
aggregate data as a single sample, we can be almost certain that the differ-
ence in outcomes associated with race over that period cannot be attrib-
uted to chance alone.  Nor can randomness be viewed as other than a
very unlikely explanation for results in at least three of the years viewed in
isolation.
Id.
Although the Code of Federal Regulations supports aggregation, it clarifies
that it should only be utilized where the “numbers . . . are too small to be relia-
ble . . . .”  29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1981) (“Where . . . evidence concerning the
impact of a selection procedure indicates adverse impact but is based upon num-
bers which are too small to be reliable, evidence concerning the impact of the
procedure over a longer period of time . . . may be considered in determining
adverse impact.”).
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provided, it may have seen the necessity for a practical significance analy-
sis.174  Finally, the court should have taken into consideration the small
difference in actual failed drugs tests between the races.175  Had it ex-
amined the practical, real-world consequences of the disparity, the court
would likely have discovered that these considerations rendered the plain-
tiffs’ statistics, at the very least, to be much less probative than they origi-
nally understood.176
VI. ROUNDING THE BASES: LOOKING FORWARD AFTER JONES
The First Circuit’s decision in Jones v. City of Boston is a prime example
of how a consideration of practical significance can effectively and more
justly change disparate impact law.177  However, as the law currently
stands, the Jones decision may have some lasting implications in both the
First Circuit and in other courts nationwide.178  Some commentators have
suggested that the First Circuit’s holding in Jones will make it easier for
plaintiffs in the First Circuit to demonstrate a prima facie case of disparate
impact.179  The case may also be a point of reference for other courts
going forward, as the use of statistics in disparate impact cases continues to
challenge both courts and practitioners alike.180  From a practitioner’s
174. See Jones, 752 F.3d at 44 (displaying plaintiffs’ sample).  The aggregated
eight-year sample included over 15,000 individuals tested. See id.  For a discussion
on how large sample sizes affect findings of statistical significance, see supra notes
56–58 and accompanying text.
175. See Jones, 752 F.3d at 44 (providing statistics).  In total, fifty-five black of-
ficers and recruits tested positive for cocaine, compared to thirty white officers and
recruits. See id. at 41.  The total numbers reveal that 0.3% of white officers (30/
10,835) and 1.3% of their black co-workers (55/4,222) failed the drug test. See id.
at 44 (comparing cocaine use between black and white officers).  The court admit-
ted that the difference between these percentages is “very small.” Id. at 42.
176. See id. at 45 (acknowledging that plaintiffs’ statistical sample “does not
establish that the differences in outcomes were large”).
177. See supra notes 166–76 and accompanying text.
178. For a discussion on the impact of the Jones decision, see infra notes
179–83 and accompanying text.
179. See Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. & Jennifer A. Riley, First Circuit Creates Potential
Circuit Split by Rejecting “Practical Significance” Requirement and Finding that Hair-Based
Drug Test Has Disparate Impact, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (May 14, 2014), http://www
.workplaceclassaction.com/2014/05/first-circuit-creates-potential-circuit-split-by-
rejecting-practical-significance-requirement-and-finding-that-hair-based-drug-test-
has-disparate-impact/ (“If the decision stands, it smooths the road for plaintiffs
looking to establish disparate impact in the First Circuit.”); see also Amici Curiae
Brief of Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association et al. at 4, Jones v. City of
Boston, 752 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2014) (No. 12-2280), 2013 WL 2149405 (describing
plaintiffs’ prima facie burden as mere threshold showing not intended to be
difficult).
180. See Alan H. Schorr, Alan Schorr’s Employment Case of the Week Ending 5/9/
14: Jones v. City of Boston, ALAN H. SCHORR & ASSOCS., P.C. (May 12, 2014, 2:07
PM), http://www.schorrlaw.com/blog/154-week-ending-5-9-jones.html (“[T]he
use of statistics in disparate impact cases continues to make this one of the most
interesting and challenging aspects of employment law.”).
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standpoint, Jones will make it more difficult to defend against a statistically
significant sample, despite any other factors that may influence that out-
come.181  Further, this case may be persuasive in light of the Supreme
Court potentially deciding a disparate impact case in the context of the
Fair Housing Act in the near future.182  Finally, employers may take the
Jones ruling into consideration when implementing new employment tests
or analyzing existing tests by remaining cognizant that they may now be
liable for any statistically significant disparity, regardless of its real-world
implications.183
181. See Lydell C. Bridgeford, Q&A: Statistical Proof of Discrimination Isn’t Static,
BLOOMBERG BNA LAB. & EMP. BLOG (June 20, 2014), http://www.bna.com/qa-sta-
tistical-proof-b17179891425/ (noting that Jones eliminates employers’ argument
for consideration of practical significance of small differences in selection rates);
Maatman & Riley, supra note 179 (asserting that plaintiffs are likely to cite Jones as
disposing of practical considerations and will pursue “practically meaningless” sta-
tistical disparities in court).
182. See Sam Hananel, Supreme Court May Get ‘Disparate Impact’ Housing Case,
INS. J. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/
09/08/339951. htm (reporting that several cases challenging Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development’s regulations based on disparate impact claims may
be heard by Supreme Court in near future).
183. See Maatman & Riley, supra note 179 (noting that practically insignificant
disparities are likely to be pursued by plaintiffs in First Circuit).
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